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A Perspective of the Emerging
Asia-Pacific Regiont
At the outset let me say how honored I am to have been invited to address
this noon such a distinguished gathering of a most esteemed organization, the
American Bar Association.
In inviting me to speak before you today, you did ask that I talk about the
Asia-Pacific region and provide you an ASEAN' perspective of what is likely
to emerge in this part of the world.
I take this interest of yours as a manifestation of the current interest in
evolving some kind of a "pan-Pacific" concept and of an awareness that
when the long-term planning horizon extending into the twenty-first century
is considered, the Asia-Pacific region invariably will stand out as the region
offering the best opportunity in the world for peaceful trade and progress.
The Pacific Basin community, as a concept; and interdependence, as a
word, have both entered our awareness in recent years. There has been much
interest in and debate about the idea of a Pacific Basin community, and a
general consensus has developed that there is a need to build upon the past
dynamic growth in the region and to evolve some mechanism for cooperation
and development among the Pacific Basin nations.
Among the factors which can be put forward in support of this projection
are:
(i) the relative political stability of the governments in most of the na-
tions located in and around the Pacific Basin;
(ii) the broad similarities among the non-communist states with respect to
world-views and types of economic and political systems;
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(iii) the fact that vast resource-rich areas remain untapped, and an abun-
dant supply of relatively cheap labor and substantial markets for
manufactured goods and services are available; and
(iv) the fact that in no other region of the world does the United States
enjoy as great an advantage over the Soviet Union in terms of military
presence and political influence.
Today, as we near the threshold of the twenty-first century, we see potent
forces emerging that would indicate that the locus of origin of major histori-
cal forces has shifted from Europe and the Atlantic Ocean in the nineteenth
century, and America and the New World in the twentieth century, to Asia
and the Pacific Ocean during the latter part of this century and into the next.
The Pacific Basin, specifically the Asia-Pacific region, is the geographic
locus where the interests of four powerful nations meet: those of the United
States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and Japan. These
four nations each embody some of the world's most forceful ideologies and
cultures, ancient as well as young. However, the eventual attainment of a
peaceful and prosperous "Pacific Community" would depend on the extent
to which the perceptions and interests of these four major powers will con-
verge.
Interest in the region has been increased in recent years by dramatic events,
notably the conclusion of a peace treaty between China and Japan and the
normalization of relations between the United States and China. And, over a
longer period, the realization has grown that the region has tremendous
economic growth potential and that China's modernization program and
entry into the mainstream of international trade and investment will be a
stabilizing influence in the region.
From the American viewpoint, the Asia-Pacific region presents a number
of attractive features which other regions of the world do not have. Most of
the countries of this region share ideological and cultural affinities with the
United States; these, in the long run, tend to provide a stable climate for
American interests which make these countries particularly receptive to
American initiatives. In addition, these countries depend on the United
States for military and economic support, and trade primarily with either the
United States or Japan. At present, more than one fourth of the total United
States trade is with the countries of this region-more than with any other
region of the world. The United States, in fact, obtains from the ASEAN area
alone one-tenth of its crude oil imports and much of its tin, bauxite, rubber,
cocoa and other important raw materials. These five countries,2 with a popu-
lation larger than all of South America, bought more than $3.7 billion worth
of American goods in 1976.
2The members of ASEAN are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand.
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As the United States becomes more dependent on other nations for its oil
and many important industrial raw materials, the Pacific Basin will be, by
any calculation, an important source in the world to satisfy United States
requirements.
If you were to make a table showing across the top the six major regions of
the world and along the column on the left a list of all the characteristics that
you would look for or that would attract you to a region, and then against this
matrix rank each region on a scale of three, I think you might find something
rather revealing as to how you perceive the world.
Characteristics of World Regions
Assessed from the United States Viewpoint
Characteristics Relative Score of Various World Regions
Asia Latin Middle South
Pacific Europe America East Africa Asia
Ideological and cultural
affinity xx xxx x
Accessibility of natural
resources xNx x x xx xx x
Business opportunities
or size of markets xxx x xx xx xxx xxx
Degree of economic
control xxx xx x x
Degree of political
military control xxx x x x x X
Political stability xx xxx x x
Political distance from
the Soviet Union xx xxx xxx xx X
Although no two countries, however similar in system, will respond simi-
larly to a given criterion, a rough comparison between major trading areas in
the world would indicate that the Asia-Pacific region offers, and will proba-
bly continue to offer, unequalled trade and investment opportunities for the
United States. In fact, it is possible to foresee that in the next few decades, the
countries of this region will assume a higher priority in American economic
policy.
At this point in history, the dream of such a "Pacific Community" is one
energetically nurtured by groups in Tokyo, Canberra, and Washington, but
this enthusiasm has not been fully shared in Beijing and Moscow. While
China has decided to fully enter the mainstream of international trade and
investments and the Soviet Union has visibly started to increase its maritime
and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region over the last few years, it
cannot be concluded that they have thus decided to contribute and participate
in the development of a prosperous economic community in and around the
Pacific. Their future actions, according to their own perceptions of their
interests in the western Pacific, may be the most crucial factors that could
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determine whether or not they will contribute to the peace and stability of this
area.
While peace is ever the goal of the smaller nation-states in and around the
Pacific Ocean, their most immediate concerns have not yet included con-
sciously contributing towards the evolution and development of a Pacific
Trade Basin. The ASEAN nations, as a group, aim for regional cohesiveness
and resilience while they also strive individually for internal political stabil-
ity, security and national economic development.
One can argue that ever since Adam and Eve, man has been living on the
brink; i.e., there has always been a bomb of some kind in the human exist-
ence. Man has had a far greater tendency to use it in his ignorance and in his
hunger than he does today with his awareness of the consequences and his
ability to get on without it.
In similar circumstances, the United States and the Soviet Union, despite
the increasing tension between them, are aware of the enormous dangers of
living with weapons systems of mutual mass destruction. As a consequence,
except by inadvertence, war between the super-powers is most unlikely and
regional factors are likely to be more important in influencing the situation in
the Asia-Pacific region than is possible super-power conflict.
The United States is now largely in a fluid and remote offshore stance, vis-
d-vis Asia, with the notable exception of Korea, where President Carter's
withdrawal plan is subject to continued deferral.
The evolving strategic situation in Asia is characterized by:
i. the rise of the Soviet Union to the position of principal rival of the
United States, particularly in East Asia but also increasingly in South-
east and South Asia;
ii. the exercise by Japan of a more independent diplomacy-more than
just the expression of its economic power-and, with one percent-of-
GNP defense budget, the attainment of a formidable military prowess;
and
iii. the disarray of the United States alliance system in Asia and the pro-
gressive limitation or denial of the United States' former network of
military bases and the complication of its capability to project force
into the area.
Along with the attenuation ,of the American alliance system, another
characteristic is the failure of any superpower to dominate the region strategi-
cally. There is a revival of fragmented conflicts or contests, not yoked in
parallel with a single major axis of confrontation. Some of the quarrels are
reversions to ancient antagonisms, overriding common ideology. Pairs of
antagonists include: the Soviet Union and China, North Korea and South
Korea; China and Vietnam; and Thailand and its communist neighbors.
There are also the continuing insurgencies in the non-communist countries of
Southeast Asia which had their beginnings in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
Domestic instability is still a problem in many nations. Having survived the
communist bloodbaths of the late 1940s, which broke out in every one of the
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ASEAN countries, every ASEAN leader is aware that successful insurgencies
share a pattern: an alternative government composed of a dissident elite,
since intellectuals, not peasants, make revolutions; the perception of an ex-
ploitative economic system that is so pervasive that citizens lose hope of any
positive change; some degree of external support; and, obviously, internal
political dissatisfaction mirrored especially in urban-rural dichotomy and
pockets of opposition intellectuals. Against such developments, they have
found that military might is not a winning strategy. It is also their perception
that outside intervention only handicaps a government by emphasizing its
dependent status and disrupting the culture.
To meet the internal threat, the idea of "national resilience" has devel-
oped. Deriving from the Malay-Indonesian word tehan (to resist), this con-
cept asserts that the nations of the area must depend on individual, internal
strength to resist insurgency and dissidence. ASEAN leaders have met the
resurgent dissident problems with greater military strength than they had
available 30 years ago. At the same time, they not only have more stable
governments, they also are stronger economically and have been able to im-
plement for the benefit of their people economic development and social
justice programs. Under such conditions, they have been able to eliminate the
popular roots of insurgency, and as each country develops its own resilience,
a collective regional resilience is hoped to be created that will discourage
external intervention.
There are wide differences among the countries of southeast Asia in their
perceptions of a possible external threat. For the countries on the mainland,
there is concern about the eventual intentions of Vietnam. The insular posi-
tions of the Philippines and Indonesia tend to reduce their sense of direct
external threat, but Indonesian defense doctrine has traditionally postulated
a threat from China, and more recently, a threat from Vietnam, despite
Vietnam's lack of amphibious capabilities. While the countries of the area see
the chances of a direct attack from either China or the Soviet Union as ex-
tremely remote, China's continued moral support of communist insurgent
movements in the region, and the Soviet aspirations for leadership of na-
tional liberation movements throughout the world, generate fears of covert
material assistance to internal dissidents from one or both powers.
As to the Vietnam-Cambodia-China conflict, ASEAN has taken a neutral
stand. This policy of neutrality is primarily intended to reduce the propensity
of great powers to intervene in Southeast Asia. The basis of this policy is
twofold. First, it is believed that Vietnam is basically nationalistic and there-
fore will try-in its own interest-not to become unnecessarily dependent
upon the U.S.S.R. Some observers question this view and point out that the
U.S.S.R. will try to impose its influence in any way possible, and that Viet-
nam itself wants to enlarge its sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. Second,
China's intention toward Southeast Asia, to some analysts, continues to be a
"riddle" for although they recognize the present parallels of interest between
the West and China, their knowledge of geometry tells them that parallel lines
do not converge.
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If Vietnam does not want to be alienated from ASEAN in the future and be
completely isolated from the West, its principal hope for aid in economic
development, it will have to show a willingness to compromise in Cambodia
and to restrain itself from any further moves, overt as well as covert, espe-
cially in Thailand. Developments in Indochina have not altered ASEAN's
perceptions of threat. This means that the nature of ASEAN's response will
not change in substance, but it will vary in degree according to developments
within the region.
A gradual increase of defense expenditures will certainly be noticeable,
though it will not be so dramatic that economic development must be sacri-
ficed. Bilateral efforts among ASEAN countries will have to be intensified to
enhance cooperation in security and defense, but the nature of an ASEAN
cooperation in this field need not be transformed into a military or other
formal alliance.
Even more important is the continuation of support for ASEAN's devel-
opment in the economic field in terms of finance, investment and trade in-
volving the public and private sectors. For its part, ASEAN would have to
strengthen economic cooperation among its members to prevent it from
slackening, as it threatens to do. The importance of outside assistance to
relieve pressures created by the refugees, especially in Thailand, Malaysia
and the Philippines, has been acknowledged internationally, but such aid lags
behind the flow of new refugees.
Intensive consultations between ASEAN and the United States are vital to
the stability of the region. China's punitive actions last year may have gradu-
ally transformed the role of the Soviet Union in the Southeast Asian region
from that of a second class presence into a first class power which, according
to ASEAN, implies a capability to project political power. Perhaps this has
been the most negative result of China's action against Vietnam.
While the ASEAN countries can cope with Vietnam by themselves, they
cannot deal with an increased military presence by the U.S.S.R. in the region.
The United States is the only power capable of balancing the emerging imbal-
ance of power. This implies that the United States has to reverse the process
of its dwindling credibility in the region. And this has to be tackled at its very
source-public and congressional support for a more comprehensive foreign
policy in the region.
The oft-repeated contention that there is a direct correlation between peace
and economic progress is simplistic, especially in areas where peace is under-
stood by certain elements as merely a continuation of the politics of violence
by other means. Likewise, an earlier United States perception that little prog-
ress could be made on socioeconomic problems until the "security shield"
was in place is not empirically correct. A successful government must tackle
both issues-economic and security-simultaneously.
The Asia-Pacific region, united until today by only the great Pacific
Ocean, is the world's fastest expanding trade and tourism area, and its vast-
ness is being conquered by sophisticated information systems and advanced
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technology. By the year 2020, Matsumoto, a Japanese futurologist who
wrote Southeast in Year 2020, predicts that this resource-rich region, whose
combined GNP has doubled in ten years, and which has been geographically
described as the wedge with countries around the South China Sea as its
resource base and Japan as its apex, will be the economic center of the world.
ASEAN, or non-communist Southeast Asia, is endowed with abundant
natural and human resources. It is a major world supplier of essential raw
materials like oil, tin, bauxite, rubber, copper, nickel, cobalt, iron ore,
chrome, coconut oil and timber. The vast oil potential of its extensive con-
tinental shelves is only beginning to be realized, attributable in large measure
to United States multinational corporations which have dominated oil ex-
ploration, production and marketing in the region since the 1960s.
Since the industry of the region is primarily agricultural and extractive, and
has shown considerable potential for growth, it offers an expanding market
for American and Japanese consumer and manufactured goods. It offers
cheap labor and opportunities for investments that have historically been
shown to be more profitable than similar investments in Europe and South
America. Since most Southeast Asian countries are developing, they are still
largely dependent on imports of machinery and manufactured goods from
the United States and Japan. With a combined population of 309 million and
a market of $240 billion which has been growing at an annual rate of nine
percent, ASEAN is an attractive trading partner.
Notwithstanding the continued uncertainties in the world economy in re-
spect of oil supply and prices, inflationary pressures, trade and payments
possibilities, monetary stability, and economic recovery of the western indus-
trial countries, the long-term outlook for the economic performance of each
of the ASEAN countries is good, and this region could continue to be the
fastest growing area of the world. This growth momentum has already been
started. It was initially sparked by the import demands of the Japanese
economy and continues to be sustained by investment outflows from Japan
and, to a lesser extent, from the United States and Australia, who have taken
advantage of the relatively cheaper transport link of the Pacific Ocean to the
region to locate more of their land, labor, resource and energy-intensive
phases of production in the ASEAN countries in order to retain their com-
petitiveness in production costs and proximity to their markets.
Despite different interests among some of its members and despite rela-
tively slow progress on matters like the industrial complementation schemes,
ASEAN has been able to contain major tensions which could have prejudiced
regional harmony. On issues like Timor, the Mindanao-Sulu conflict, the
Vietnamese boat people, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampu-
chea and Vietnamese intrusions into Thai border areas, the five members of
ASEAN have demonstrated their collective interest and political commit-
ment to ASEAN solidarity. The Association has been accepted by the major
powers as a cohesive and an effective regional group with which they must
now relate and take into consideration in formulating their respective policies
with respect to the area.
138 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
The future fate of the region once might have been determined largely by
the evolution of the dynamic balance of power in the years ahead. To a large
extent this will still be true, but this should not obscure the strong resolve of
the ASEAN states to enhance their independence, self-reliance and self-
esteem. While having little capacity individually to influence the balance of
power game, ASEAN, by being internally strong and by containing possible
threats arising internally from indigenous, divisive forces, can, to a limited
extent, influence the basic character of the power game by not creating situa-
tions or conditions that would upset the present balance and attract the inter-
ference or intervention of external forces in their affairs.
To the ASEAN people then, the best guarantee against any threat to secu-
rity, whether internal or external, whether economic or military, is that their
people are free from hunger, disease, ignorance, exploitation; and the surest
way of fomenting rebellion or inviting intervention from outside is to perpet-
uate a state of underdevelopment and all that it implies for the human condi-
tion: underprivileged masses with a pitifully low standard of living.
The ASEAN leadership know what it is like to go through a communist
bloodbath, and they know what communism thrives on. They are aware that
once the conditions for discontent and unrest and dissidence are removed,
then the conditions that give rise to communism will no longer exist.
For the leadership then, the ultimate strategy is development and the ulti-
mate purpose is human welfare. All others are supportive tributaries to the
mainstream that will ultimately bring the boons of science and technology,
social organization and management of resources to the people.
The enlarged concept of security that embraces the special dimensions re-
ferred to by (former) Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in his keynote address to
you yesterday takes note of how the ASEAN nations' perceptions of security
differ from the perceptions of, say, NATO members. Vance's suggestion that
key issues, e.g., energy, food, unemployment, etc., be discussed in a Pacific
round table by leaders and experts from the private sector across the Pacific
would certainly be welcomed by the ASEAN countries who view private
enterprise as the main engine for economic growth in their countries. Such an
informal organization already exists in the Pacific Forum organized here in
Hawaii, and to the credit of this organization it has done much in its own way
to bridge the North-South problems in the region.
While there is an occasional throwback reference to the need for a protec-
tive "shield" especially by outside powers over the region as the various
countries go about the business of development, it is already a recognized
principle that the best shield is internal, and that the only guarantee that
works is a social system that works. It works if the economy provides the
basic necessities; it works if the political and social institutions work for the
attainment of these and other aspirations, and generate a sense of identity,
pride and self-respect. It works if the entire society is enabled to enter in the
mainstream of world society with dignity, and with the capacity to contribute
its full share to the advance of mankind. And judging from the performance
of each of the ASEAN countries, the system each has evolved appears to be
working well for the larger masses of their people.
